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Comparative Law in a Time of Nativism  
 
 




Pressures of globalization have strained population movements, 
restructured markets have led to widening economic divides, and 
terrorism has redefined national borders and identity.  What we have 
seen in response is a rise in nationalism, nativism and in the extreme 
cases, isolationism.  This inward turn seems to be true at least in the 
U.S. and in China.  This turning inward presents a challenge to those 
of us who work in and champion the cause of comparative law, since 
comparative studies by its nature urges us to turn our gaze outward.  
This article examines what the turn to nativism means for the field of 
comparative law and methodology, and how we as comparativists 




The Chinese have an ancient curse:  “May you live in interesting 
times.”  While seemingly a blessing, the expression is always used 
ironically, with the clear implication that “uninteresting times,” of 
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peace and tranquility, are more life enhancing than interesting ones, 
which from historical perspective usually include disorder and 
conflict. 
We are now living in “interesting times.”  The pressures of 
globalization have strained population movements, restructured 
markets have led to widening economic instability, and terrorism has 
been allowed to redefine national borders and identity.  What we 
have seen in response is a rise in nationalism, nativism and in the 
extreme cases, isolationism – this seems to be true at least in the U.S. 
and in China.   
In the U.S., the new Trump administration quickly moved to 
implement an inward looking policy.  This policy include an almost 
exclusive focus on the threat of the Islamic State, a skeptical view of 
multilateral alliances including NATO, and an “America First” 
rationale for hard line economic policies.  Within two weeks of his 
inauguration, America’s new President Trump moved to sign 
withdrawal from a major trade pact, a ban on all visitors from seven 
majority Muslim countries, and a temporary ban on all new refugees. 
This is not an isolated trend.  Many have analogized the U.S. 
turn inward to the recent and equally surprising Brexit, in which 
Britain by popular vote chose to leave the alliances of the European 
Union.1  The electoral victory of Donald Trump, the Brexit vote and 
the rise of an aggressive nationalism in mainland Europe and around 
the world are all part of a backlash to globalization.2  Interestingly, 
China too is facing retrenchment from its decades long policy of 
“opening up reforms,” a retrenchment which according to some is 
the most severe in 30 years.   
Just after becoming the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of China in late 2012, Xi Jinping announced what would 
 
 1. Ruchir, Sharma, Globalization as we know it is over – and Brexit is the biggest sign 
yet, THE GUARDIAN, (July 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016   
/jul/28/era-globalisation-brexit-eu-britain-economic-frustration. 
 2. There is also a rising nativism as native purity is cast in contrast to the profane 
foreign.  Across Europe from Bulgaria to Poland and the U.K., new nationalisms have a 
distinct xenophobia. Politicians such as Marine Le Pen in France recall an idealized past as a 
cure for the cultural chaos of modernity.  Politicians can often gain political traction by 
describing national cultural traditions as under attack from the outside. 
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become the hallmark of his administration – that is, the pursuit of 
“the Chinese Dream.”3  The Chinese Dream, according to Xi is “the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Chinese citizens, President 
Xi urged, should “dare to dream, work assiduously to fulfill the 
dreams and contribute to the revitalization of the nation.”  The goal 
is less about individual fulfillment or convergence towards a 
universal community but rather, about Chinese prosperity, national 
glory and the collective effort towards that goal.  Since then, the turn 
inward has led to greater “internal repression, external truculence, 
and a seeming indifference to the partnership part of the U.S.-China 
relationship.”  According to some, the China of 2016 is “repressive 
in a way that it had not been since the Cultural Revolution.” 4   
These retrenchments are notably distinct from the early 2000s 
when there were optimistic predictions of a transnational legal 
system and globalized judiciary.5  National boundaries were said to 
be less important in this global age.  It was an active era of the 
formation of supranational courts and tribunals and exciting 
advances in the comparative law arena. Constitutional, national and 
regional courts were also beginning to take each other into account 
when rendering justice.  Scholars speculated on a convergence of 
norms and others, such as Ann Marie Slaughter, even optimistically 
predicted one global legal system or at the very least, a global 
community of courts.6  This turning inward presents a challenge to 
those of us who work in and champion the cause of comparative 
law, since comparative studies by its nature urges us to turn our 
 
 3. Central Party School Central Committee of the Communist Party of China edited by 
Rogier Creemers, The Chinese Dream Infuses Socialism with Chinese Characteristics with 
New Energy, (May 6, 2013), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/05/06 
/the-chinese-dream-infuses-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-with-new-energy/. 
 4. James Fallows, China’s Great Leap Backward, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leapbackward/505817/.  
In that same article, Asia Society’s Orville Schell was quoted as saying, “In my lifetime I 
did not imagine I would see the day when China regressed back closer to its Maoist roots.  I 
am fearing that now.”  
 5. See Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and 
the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 345–387 (2005).  
 6. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 191, 
191–219 (2003). 
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gaze outward.   
Fears about the demise of comparative law are not new.  
Critiques of comparative law have ranged from challenges to its 
alleged lack of a methodological core to predictions that 
globalization would lead to the end of diversity in legal systems. 
Comparative law, Mathias Reiman famously argued, “has made little 
progress as a coherent enterprise generating broader insight of 
general interest. Most of its scholarship remains random, 
unconnected, and thus inconsequential.”7  But as globalization 
continued, comparative law gained greater importance in promoting 
international understanding.  The methodology has been used to 
inform national law making, aid judges in difficult decisions, and 
provide a basis for legal unification or harmonization.  According to 
some scholars, transnationalism has only made comparative law 
more complex, “in moving its focus from beyond the state as the sole 
lawmakers to significant lawmaking by non-state actors; beyond 
positive law to the importance of soft law, beyond legal science to an 
embrace of social science.”8 
And so, during periods of globalization, the purposes of 
comparative law morphed in the promotion of transnational 
understanding, national reform and global unification.9   
But is the comparative law discipline today facing yet a different 
challenge?  This article looks at the flipside of globalization and 
examines the challenges facing comparative law from another 
direction – that of a nation’s turn inward with the rise of nationalism.  
Certainly, “the supreme paradox of this decade is the simultaneous 
acceleration of a globalized world and the vigorous reassertion of 
local claims to allegiance.”10  And in the most recent months, we 
 
 7. Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second 
Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. OF COMP. L., 671, 673 (2002). 
 8. Ralf Michaels, Transnationalizing Comparative Law, 23 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & 
COMP. L. 2 (2016). 
 9. HIRAM E. CHODOSH, GLOBAL JUSTICE REFORM:  A COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 28 
(2005). 
 10. Oscar Chase, Some Observations on the Cultural Dimension in Civil Procedure 
Reform, 45 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 861 (Autumn 1997).  
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have seen the growing surge of local claims to allegiance taking front 
and center stage.  Within this local claim to allegiance are seeds of 
nativism and a rejection of a gaze outward as the gaze turns inward 
within a nation’s boundaries, history and culture.  And so, how 
should comparative law respond to these recent challenges to our 
tasks?   
In part, answering this question requires an understanding of the 
trajectory of comparative law, a shift in our critiques of the field, and 
an adjustment in our goals.  We examine these questions in the 
context of two countries – China and the U.S. – each with a vastly 
different legal system from the other, but each has proceeded down 
similar paths in recent procedural reforms.  Where the U.S. is a 
common law, adversarial system based on a liberal democratic 
tradition.  China, meanwhile, is a civil law, inquisitorial system 
based on a Maoist socialist legality.  While both countries have 
experimented with looking abroad towards transnational procedures, 
both countries have also in recent years withdrawn their attention 
inward.  Whether this is a reaction to global transnational efforts or 
nationalism or simply the guise of legal imperialism,11 this trend is 
worthy of our attention as we comparativists search again for a 
proper balance between the transnational and the national and 
mediating between the conflict claim of the global and the local. 
 
Comparative Law in the U.S. and China 
 
Although reformers and scholars have historically used the 
technique of comparison (Aristotle in the 4th century was said to have 
collected the constitutions of no fewer than 158 city states in his 
effort to devise a model constitution),12 the term “comparative law” 
was not introduced until the end of the 19th century.  Countries, such 
as Japan and China, used the comparative method in the late 19th 
 
 11. TARAN TARAYAOGUI, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND EXTRATERRI- 
TORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA (2010). 
 12. PETER JOHN RHODES, A COMMENTARY ON THE ARISTOTELIAN ATHENAION POLITEIA 
2–5 (Oxford University Press) (1993); see also Constitution of the Athenians, The 
Encyclopedia of Ancient History (2012). 
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century in the establishment of their modern legal system.  Most 
notably, China’s contemporary legal system is an amalgam of civil 
law structure from Japan, Germany, and socialist law tradition form 
the former USSR, and traditional Confucian legal thought. 
Comparative law received a revival of sorts in the last decade of 
the 20th century with the double process of economic globalization 
and Europeanization of law.  It served as the tool for the many “rule of 
law” projects underway in many countries and funded by 
multinational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund.  
Comparative law has been critical to the work of European Union 
institutions.  From the basic question of whether the E.U. should be 
permitted to act to whether legal differences created obstacles to the 
internal market, comparative law was called upon as the E.U. decided 
on new areas of regulation and assessed how it should interact with 
national law in complex ways.  And where E.U. law did not replace 
national laws, a good comparative understanding of member state laws 
has been a prerequisite for the successful implementation of E.U. laws. 
For a number of reasons, procedural law proves particularly fruitful 
for comparative studies.  Rules of procedure uniquely combine the 
universal with the cultural.  Procedural rules are simultaneously cultural 
messages about how we fight but they receive legitimacy precisely from 
their universal claim of “rule of law” and procedural justice.  And so, 
efforts abound with a focus on a search for the universal or at minimal, 
harmonization in the area of procedural law.  Furthermore, within the last 
twenty or so years, civil procedural reforms have been unusually active in 
national systems of civil procedure, often aided by comparative studies.  
Countries as diverse as Japan, Korea, England and Austria have all 
adopted new civil procedure systems.  
Certainly, the reason for focusing on comparative procedure in 
particular is due to the growth in international economic transactions.  In 
this era of transnational conflicts, the pressure for harmonization of 
domestic civil procedure rules is strong to prevent parties from forum 
shopping in transnational disputes.  As international economic 
transactions aided by technology increasingly lead to complex legal 
problems without borders, efforts are being made to draft transnational 
rules.  And so, we see the development of influential international 
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regulations and conventions playing an important harmonization role, 
such as article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.   
The European Union, in particular, has taken the lead in a movement 
towards transnational procedure.  For example, the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, now converted into a European Regulation, is 
applicable to all member states except Denmark.  In the European Union, 
Article 65 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Articles 
III-158, and III-170 of the proposed European Convention) provides a 
legal basis for the harmonization of civil procedural law, at least as 
regards civil matters having cross border implications and in so far as 
necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market.  More 
globally, under the sponsorship of the American Law Institute and 
UNIDROIT, The Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure were 
drafted under the sponsorship of the American Law Institute and 
UNIDROIT aimed at providing a framework that a country might adopt 
for the adjudication of disputes arising from international transactions that 
find their way into the ordinary courts of justice.13   
Finally, procedure also took a front and center place in the “rule of 
law” movement.  Multi-national organizations equate economic 
development with “rule of law” and democratization.14  Thus, a well-
functioning system of public dispute resolution, particularly for ordinary 
people, is said to be an essential element of justice and important in 
avoiding privatization of enforcement.15  Civil procedure is at the heart 
of this belief and the growth of statistical methodology has led to such 
ambitious comparative studies as the Courts: Lex Mundi study, which 
created an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for 109 
 
 13. See ALI/Unidroit, Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, http://www.unidroit. 
org/english/principles/civilprocedure/ali-unidroitprinciples-e.pdf. 
 14. See, e.g., Matteo Cervellati et al., Democratization and the Rule of Law (2009), 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/gtdw_e/wkshop10_e/fortunato_e.pdf. 
 15. Thus, an independent and properly functioning judiciary is a prerequisite for the 
rule of law, which requires a just legal system, the right to a fair hearing and access to 
justice.  See Massimo Tommasoli, Rule of Law and Democracy: Addressing the Gap 
Between Policies and Practices, U.N. CHRONICLE, vol. XLIX No. 42012 (Dec. 2012), 
https://unchronicle.un.org/article/rule-law-and-democracy-addressing-gap-between-policies-
and-practices. 
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countries.16  The controversial Lex Mundi study concluded that 
procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of 
judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, 
less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice.  More 
problematically, Lex Mundi also suggested that legal transplantation 
might have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, 
particularly in developing countries.  
 
 A. The U.S. Experiment 
 
In both China and the U.S., the use of comparative law has ebbed 
and flowed.  The ebb and flow of comparative law is particularly 
surprising in the case of the United States in light of the country’s history 
of immigration and assimilation of different cultures.  Even the formation 
of the U.S. itself can be said to be an experiment in comparative law.  
While later interpretations of the U.S. Constitution have been more 
pointedly restricted to the original language and intent of the drafters at 
the time and place of the drafting, the text of the constitution itself is 
undeniably an “international document” drafted with reference to foreign 
models and imbued in the ideologies of the European Enlightenment.17   
And so, the U.S. has not always been a stranger to referencing 
foreign legal materials. Throughout its history, U.S. courts have 
honored foreign law in both federal and state courts as long as it does 
not conflict with public policy.  Thus, U.S. courts will apply 
international and foreign law without much fanfare in ordinary cases, 
such as in cases involving a right under a treaty or when parties 
agreed to choice of law of another country, but it is most 
controversial when it comes to interpreting the Constitution or U.S. 
law.  Yet, even in the area of constitutional interpretation, in the 
aftermath of WWII and fascism, the “inherent dignity” of all people 
 
 16. Simeon Djankov et al., Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 889, April 2002), http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmund 
i/PDF/courts_nber1.pdf?SnID=. 
 17. Similarly, it was one of the first U.S. treaties responsible for establishing American 
sovereignty: The Treaty of Paris, ratified by Congress in 1784.  See Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Gr. 
Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat.80. 
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was recognized18 and entered into the vocabulary of international law 
and later, made its way into U.S. jurisprudence.  Thus, in 1942 and 
1943 cases upholding a criminal defendant’s right to counsel and 
detained individuals’ rights to be brought before a neutral third party, 
Justice Felix Frankfurter explained that, “democratic society, in 
which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards 
against the misuse of the law enforcement process.”19   
Since then, the term “personal dignity” has been linked to equal 
protection, liberty and due process rights of the U.S. Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Thus, in more recent cases such as those upholding an 
individual’s right to same-sex relationship20 and marriage,21 Supreme 
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy pointed to a person’s dignity and 
autonomy as central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The “dignity” term also entered state constitutional 
amendments after WWII, such as the 1972 amendment of the 
Montana state constitution with Louisiana following suit in 1974.  
But in the area of procedure, Americans are notoriously 
“exceptional,” clinging closely to the adversary system.  
Comparative procedure is rarely studied, taught or followed.  With 
the exception of perhaps the Field Code, enacted around the turn of 
the 19th century, there may be three areas of comparative reference 
in recent years – pleadings, punitive damages, and the involvement 
of the judge.  Thus, for example, the Supreme Court in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker compared American punitive damage awards 
with those of Great Britain, Canada and Australia, among other 
 
 18. These include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
 19. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). 
 20. As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained for the majority, states cannot make 
criminal the act of same sex sodomy because “[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate 
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 21. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). Justice Kennedy, in finding 
the congressional refusal to recognize same sex marriages to be unconstitutional, again 
wrote of relational rights in dignity terms.  Id. 
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jurisdictions, to determine whether a punitive award was excessive.22  
And in 2004, as mentioned earlier, the American Law Institute and 
UNIDROIT jointly drafted, Principles of Civil Procedure in an 
attempt to develop harmonized principles for transnational litigation.  
But neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor state civil 
procedure rules make reference to these principles. 
Furthermore, the last decade saw a progression in heightened 
antagonism against the relevance of foreign legal materials in U.S. 
courts.  For example, the citation to the almost universal rejection of 
the death penalty in Europe in interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment was met with 
objections.23  Meanwhile, the last four nominees to the U.S. Supreme 
Court were repeatedly questioned about whether they would turn to 
sources outside the United States when interpreting domestic 
constitutional obligations, with each nominee eschewing the use of 
foreign legal materials.24  
In 2005, soon-to-be Justice John Roberts cited “democratic 
theory” as a basis for his view that using non-U.S. law for 
constitutional interpretation was unwise.25  Samuel Alito in 2006 also 
rejected foreign law for constitutional interpretation and held the 
position “We have our own law.  We have our own traditions.  We 
have our own precedents.  And we should look to that in interpreting 
our constitution.”26  In 2009, Sonia Sotomayer stated “American law 
does not permit the use of foreign law or international law to 
interpret the constitution.”27  Elena Kagan in 2010 likewise 
 
 22. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 23. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324–25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.. dissenting); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 24. See JUDITH RESNIK, CONSTRUCTING THE FOREIGN: AMERICAN LAW’S RELATIONSHIP 
TO NON-DOMESTIC SOURCES, IN COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Mads Andenas et al. eds., 
2015).  
 25. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States Before the Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. at 201 (2005). 
 26. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito Jr. to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Subcomm. of the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. at 320 (2006). 
 27. Confirmation Hearing on the nomination of Sonia Sotomayer to be an Associate 
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registered an insistence on the use of American sources.  Justice 
Kagan stated, “And except with respect to a very limited number of 
issues . . . the fundamental sources of legal support and legal 
argument for that Constitution ought to be American.”28 
This resistance to global norms can be similarly seen in a debate 
between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Steven 
Breyer.29  In considering the relevance of foreign legal materials in 
U.S. constitutional cases, Justice Breyer maintained that as a judge, 
he is looking for the best answer to and for that purpose reason takes 
into account the views of other judges throughout the world. This is 
in contrast with Justice Scalia who maintained that, when 
interpreting the American Constitution, it should be “to try to 
understand what it meant, what it was understood by the society to 
mean when it was adopted,”30 and not “to selectively choose foreign 
law when it agrees with what the justices would like the case to say, 
but not use it when it doesn’t agree.”31  
By 2013, antiforeign law prohibitions had been introduced in 31 
states, although most without success of passing.  In Oklahoma, 70 
percent of Oklahoma citizens who voted supported a 2010 
constitutional amendment (“Save our State”) instructing that state 
judges not to look at the “legal precepts of other nations or cultures 
and specifically not to consider either “international or Sharia law.”  
After being challenged and overturned, Oklahoma then enacted a 
statute that no longer mentions Sharia law but banned reliance on 
foreign law if not providing the “same fundamental liberties, rights 
 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Subcomm. of the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. at 442 (2009). 
 28. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Subcomm. of the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. at 127 (2010). 
 29. Norman Dorsen, The relevance of foreign legal materials in U.S. constitutional 
cases: A conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 519, 523. (2005). 
 30. Id. at 525. 
 31. Id. at 521.  But Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Sotomayor diverge from 
the view to support “broader consideration of foreign and international law in U.S. judicial 
opinions.”  While on the court, Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor at times supported 
judicial consultation of decisions of other constitutional courts outside the United States. 
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and privileges granted under the United States and Oklahoma 
Constitutions.”32  More problematically, some of these bans not only 
prohibit the use of foreign law when the law at issue is at variance 
with constitutional values, but when the legal system of the country 
from which the law emerges is itself said to be not in conformity 
with these values.  This essentially engages state courts in wholesale 
evaluation of foreign legal systems.33  
In addition to Oklahoma’s constitutional and statutory 
enactments, the states of Alabama, Kansas, Arizona, Louisiana, 
South Dakota, Mississippi, and Tennessee have put into their laws 
variously worded prohibitions against ‘foreign” law.34  Some of these 
bans not only prohibit the use of foreign law when the law at issue is 
at variance with constitutional values, but also when the legal system 
itself of the country from which the law emerges is said to be not in 
conformity with these values.  This essentially engages U.S. courts in 
wholesale evaluation of foreign legal systems.35  
On the national front, members of Congress have repeatedly 
introduced resolutions such as the one by Representative Diane 
Black (R-TN) to ban the use of foreign law in federal courts.36  In 
 
 32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §20 (B) (West 2017). 
 33. FAIZA PATEL, MATTHEW DUS, & AMOS DOH, FOREIGN LAW BANS:  LEGAL 
UNCERTAINTIES AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 3 (Ctr. for Am. Progress & Brennan Ctr. for 
Just. at N.Y.U. 2013).  Many have attributed this antiforeign law campaign to be a guise for 
the patently unconstitutional practice of anti-Sharia. 
 34. For a full list of the proposed bills in 2016, see Gavel to Gavel, Bans on court use of 
sharia/international law: GA House approves modified bill; Mississippi bill to ban sharia in 
divorce cases dies (March 1, 2016) http://gaveltogavel.us/2016/03/01/bans-on-court-use-of-
shariainternational-law-ga-house-approves-modified-bill-mississippi-bill-to-ban-sharia-in-
divorce-cases-dies/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).  Georgia’s house was the latest to join the list 
in passing a heavily amended version of HB 171.  As introduced, the bill provided:  
Any tribunal ruling shall be void and unenforceable if the tribunal bases its ruling 
in whole or in part on any foreign law that would deny the parties the rights and 
privileges granted under the United States Constitution or the Georgia 
Constitution. 
 35. Faiza Patel, Matthew Dus, and Amos Doh, Foreign Law Bans: Legal Uncertainties 
and Practical Problems, Center for American Progress, Brennan Center for Justice (May 
2013).  Many have attributed this antiforeign law campaign to be a guise for the patently 
unconstitutional practice of anti-Sharia. 
 36.  U.S. House Resolution 3052 provides: Limitation on use of foreign law in Federal 
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support of bills such as this one, Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) warns 
that a trend of citing foreign decisions would mean that, “the 
American people may be losing control over the meaning of our laws 
and of our Constitution.”  
 
 B. Comparative Law in Chinese Procedural Reform 
 
Comparative law has played a strong role in the development of 
the modern Chinese legal system.  Certainly, the early Republican 
legal system in the early 20th century was modeled after the German 
civil law system as imported to China from Japan.  After the 
establishment of the People’s Republic, further legal transplantation 
took place with the addition of socialist ideology.  The period from 
1989 until early 2000 again saw legal transplantation of ideas from 
western nations and this time, from the United States with its 
adversary system.37 
But China has been very effective in differentiating and 
segregating its legal system with one part more consistent with 
international standards for commercial disputes involving foreign 
parties, and one more in line with Communists/traditional Chinese 
ideology for disputes involving domestic citizens.  Thus, China has a 
robust arbitration system model run by China’s International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for commercial 
disputes involving international parties that is based on international 
norms and customs.38  The arbitral system was adopted early in 
 
courts “In any court created by or under article III of the Constitution of the United States, 
no justice, judge, or other judicial official shall decide any issue in a case before that court 
in whole or in part on the authority of foreign law, except to the extent the Constitution or 
an Act of Congress requires the consideration of that foreign law.”  http://black.house.gov/ 
sites/black.house.gov/files/BLACK_036_xml.pdf. 
 37.  Zhaoxing Liu & Jinyuan Su, Comparative Law in China: Over 30 Years’ 
Development and Paradigm Shift in Research, 1 CHIN. J. COMP. L. 158, 158–84 (2013). 
 38. The State Council’s Official Reply Concerning the Renaming of the Foreign 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission as the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission and the Amendment of Its Arbitration Rules, THE GAZETTE 
OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PRC, (June 21, 1988).  On December 2, 1986, the NPC of 
China declared to adhere to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.  See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Feign 
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China’s economic reform in 1979 and based primarily on the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law,39 the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards and later, on The UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Trade Arbitration 1985 (amended 2006). 
Within the domestic court area, it was a different matter.  The 
early civil court system that was reinstated and the 1982 civil 
procedure code (trial implementation) emphasized conciliation, 
rather than adjudication, as under the communist and traditional 
Chinese system.  It was thought that civil disputes in which no 
“enemies” stood out would most be resolved by the neighborhood or 
mediation committees.  Formal trials were quite rare and it was a 
supra inquisitorial mode of civil procedure in which the court took 
control of everything from investigation with no limitations and 
beyond parties claims.  It was not until the enactment of the 1991 
civil procedure law that greater change took place in the domestic 
civil litigation system.   
The 1991 Civil Procedure Law took on elements from 
continental Europe and Anglo-American laws.40  It was a transition 
from conciliation to adjudication with the introduction of western 
procedural concepts into civil justice, such as the burden of proof 
from the Anglo-American tradition and the “principles of oral 
argument” (Verhandlungsmaxime) from the German/Japanese 
tradition.41  It was also a principle of party rather than court 
disposition.42  Later amendments added pretrial procedures, which, 
combined with a more robust trial opening structure, brought about 
 
Arbitral Awards, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/unc 
itral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html. 
 39. This was recommended by the General Assembly in its Resolution 31/98 of 
December 15, 1976.  General Assembly resolution 31/98, Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, A/RES/31/98 (15 December 1976). 
 40. Ya Xin Wang, The Various Roots of Civil Litigation in China and the Influence of 
Foreign Laws in the Global Era, 2 CIV. PROC. REV.119, 119–47 (Sept.-Dec. 2011). 
 41. See Several Provisions of the SPC on the Issues Concerning the Civil and Economic 
Trial Mode Reform (1998); see also Some Provisions of the SPC on Evidence in Civil 
Procedures (2001). 
 42. China Civil Procedure Act, art. 13. (1991). 
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the so-called two stage trial structure.  In focusing on the parties and 
the trial process, these changes were said to pave the way to greater 
transparency as decisions were rendered in open court after exchange 
of evidence and oral arguments.43 
Indeed, the 1990s saw China quite openly experiment with various 
models of civil justice.  Many foreign codes as well as legal works 
written by foreign leading scholars were translated and published.  
According to one count, comparative law scholarship increased by more 
than 20 times within the last 30 years.44  Concepts such as “due process,” 
class/representative actions, legal vs. objective truth, “equality before the 
law,” “the rule of law,” “judicial independence,” made their way into the 
conversation in the development of the Chinese civil procedure.  
But, as in the United States, the most recent decade saw caution 
raised by party leaders against borrowing institutions wholesale from 
abroad.  As the reality of greater legal formality without greater legal 
representation led to greater dissatisfaction with the Chinese courts, 
litigants flocked to file letters and petitions of appeal to 
governmental agencies, and sometimes, to the streets.45  Concerned 
with threats of social instability because courts were not able to “end 
the disputes,” the Chinese government launched the next set of 
policy and reforms.  This time, the emphasis was on preserving 
social harmony.46  The then President Xi Jinping announced the 
national goal of preserving a “harmonious society.”  Chinese courts 
similarly followed suit, with a returned emphasis on mediation and 
conciliation, and a more diversified approach to civil trials.  Chinese 
judges were asked to multitrack litigation, to mediate cases, and to 
“end” disputes, rather than adjudicate them, in an effort to preserve 
 
 43. See SPC interpretations such as the Several Provisions of the SPC on the Issues 
Concerning the Civil and Economic Trial Mode Reform (1998); see also Some Provisions of 
the SPC on Evidence in Civil Procedures (2001). 
      44.  Fallows, supra footnote 4. 
 45. Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 103–05 (2006). 
 46. See China.org.cn, China Publishes ‘Harmonious Society’ Resolution, (Oct. 19, 
2006), http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/184810.htm [hereinafter Harmonious 
Society Resolution]. 
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harmony.47  
In the 2012 Amendment to the 1991 Civil Procedure Law, the latest 
and the most comprehensive to date, the amendments took a multitrack 
approach to litigation, in which the court must, in the early stages of 
litigation, assess and track the case in one of the following four ways – if 
the case has little or no factual disputes (such as in debt collection), an 
expedited procedure (du cu cheng xu, 督促程序, translated loosely as 
“supervising procedure”); mediation is to be used if the litigants’ dispute 
is more substantial, but believed to be capable of settlement; simplified 
procedure (jian yi cheng xu 简易程序) or ordinary procedure (pu tong 
cheng xu 普通程序), according to the needs of the case; trial procedure 
(kai ting sheng li 开庭审理) for a case that requires litigants to exchange 
evidence to clarify the points of dispute (Article 133).  The multi-track 
approach reemphasizes mediation as the preferred method of resolution 
and funnels cases away from trials and adjudicated results. 
Undeniably, this multitrack system is partly a response to the 
dramatic caseload now facing the overburdened Chinese courts.  
According to the Supreme People’s Court, the number of court cases 
rose by at least 25 percent between 2005 and 2009 but the total 
number of judges (190,000) remained almost the same.  According to 
at least one observer, such reforms are a reflection of an ‘institutional 
pragmatism’ on the part of Chinese courts to protect their own 
institutional power by enhancing efficiency.   
Since then, the latest Chinese leadership has pronounced yet 
another national goal – that of the “Chinese dream.”  Just after 
becoming the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China 
in late 2012, Xi Jinping announced what would become the 
hallmark of his administration – that is, the pursuit of “the 
Chinese Dream,”48 which according to Xi is “the great 
 
 47.   See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Sifa Jianyi Gongzuo Wei 
Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Tigong Sifa Fuwu de Tongzhi, 
最高人民法院关于进一步加强司法建议工作为构建社会主义和谐社会提供司法服务的
通知 [Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court, Regarding the Next Step Towards Litigation 
Development According to Socialist Principals and Harmonious Society] ¶ 2 (2007), 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=91949 [hereinafter Next 
Step]. 
 48. Central Party School Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, The 
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rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”  Chinese citizens, President 
Xi urged, should “dare to dream, work assiduously to fulfill the 
dreams and contribute to the revitalization of the nation.”  The 
goal is less about individual fulfillment or convergence towards a 
universal community but rather, about Chinese prosperity, 
national glory and the collective effort towards that goal.  Since 
then, the turn inward has led to greater “internal repression, 
external truculence, and a seeming indifference to the partnership 
part of the U.S.-China relationship.”49   
The turn inward was reinforced by the issuance of the Decision 
concerning “Comprehensively Promoting Governing the Country 
According to Law” (the Decision) by the 4th Plenum of the 18th 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).50  While 
this is not the first time the CCP inserted law in its programmatic 
proposals,51 this is the first time a CCP central committee devoted an 
entire plenary session Decision solely to the topic of law.  
Significantly, while reaffirming the importance of law in governance 
and giving greater operational meaning to the term, the Plenum 
Decision unequivocally reaffirms the primacy of the Party and its 
central role as the initiator of law. 
In focusing attention on law, the Plenum Decision is the Party’s 
effort to capture law as “socialist rule of law with Chinese 
characteristics.”  Containing both symbolic messages and concrete 
 
Chinese Dream Infuses Socialism with Chinese Characteristics with New Energy, (May 6, 
2013), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/05/06/the-chinese-dream-infus 
es-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-with-new-energy/ 
 49. James Fallows, China’s Great Leap Backward, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2016.  In 
that same article, Asia Society’s Orville Schell was quoted as saying “In my lifetime I did 
not imagine I would see the day when China regressed back closer to its Maoist roots.  I am 
fearing that now.”  
 50. CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in 




 51. Since the 11th Party Congress, China has recognized the need for law in a market 
economy and in 1999, China incorporated the words “rule the country according to law, 
establish a socialist rule of law state” into its constitution. 
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proposals, the Plenum Decision unapologetically outlined the 
dominance of the Chinese Communist Party and China as a 
developmental state. Having studied foreign models in other 
countries for the last thirty years, a more powerful and assertive 
China is now emphasizing that as in its economic reforms, China will 
follow its own path to legal reforms and “will not indiscriminately 
copy foreign rule of law concepts and models.”  China under the 
leadership of the CCP will be the one to define what is meant by 
“socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics.” 
And “socialist law with Chinese characteristics” means the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.  Operationally, the 
Plenum Decision openly acknowledged that “in all cases where 
legislation involves adjustment to major structures or major policies, 
it must be reported to the Party Centre Committee for discussion and 
decision.”  While it is common knowledge that most legislation 
originates from Party policy and must meet the approval of Party 
leadership, this was the first time that the Party openly acknowledged 
and affirmed concretely the role of the Party in China’s governance 
and in the making of laws.  Further, the Plenum Decision explicitly 
emphasized the dual structure of the Party-state constitutional order.  
China will govern according to law 依法治国, but the Party will be 
governed according to its own internal regulations 依规治党.  
According to the Plenum Decision, Party discipline can be more 
stringent than law.52   
But the Plenum Decision is unequivocal.  China will govern by 
law, but China will not necessarily abide by “rule of law” as defined 
by western liberal democratic thought.  China will move to curb 
arbitrary powers according to law; but it will not necessarily subject 
 
 52. However, to ensure that leaders in all sectors take law seriously, the Plenum 
Decision anticipates that law indicators be written into annual cadre performance 
evaluations.  The Plenum Decision also promises a more rule-based order for the Party – 
party rules will be strengthened, and while party institutions such as political legal 
committees and party cells in the courts will continue, their roles, authority and duties will 
be clarified.  Interestingly, Party internal rules are highly formal and structured and some 
even contain aspects of due process protection (“shuang gui” hearing).  A Xinhua report on 
a two-year-old campaign within the Party system (中央   公厅法规局) to clean up (qingli) 
old/conflicting Party rules and regulations.   
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public authority to a higher law.  This “rule by law” is a socialist 
conception of “rule of law,” in which law is positive, created by the 
people as led by the Party, the true democratic representative of the 
people.  Thus, China’s leaders defend their system of governance as 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and similarly, their legal 
system as “rule of law with Chinese characteristics.”  They argue it is 
best suited to China’s “national conditions.” 
The latest Supreme People’s Court Five Year Reform Plan 
(2014-2015) also made clear that “Deepening of reform on the 
people’s courts will be carried out start to finish under the leadership 
of the party.”53  But more blatantly, the reform plan warns that China 
will not be following foreign models blindly.  Chief Justice Zhou, the 
head of the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing, in a recent statement 
to legal officials in Beijing declared that, “We should resolutely 
resist erroneous influence from the West: ‘constitutional democracy,’ 
‘separation of powers’ and ‘independence of the judiciary.’” Chief 
Justice Zhou has been recognized as a moderate reformer who has 
strived to professionalize the Chinese judiciary in recent years.  His 
speech was widely seen as a bow to the strict political climate that Xi 
Jinping has established in China in response to rising domestic 
instability created by the greater disparity from the global 
marketplace.54  
Since then, Chinese Education Minister Yuan Guiren laid out 
new rules restricting the use of Western textbooks and banning those 
sowing “Western values.”55  Current leadership has rejected many of 
 
 53. 最高法发布全面深化人民法院改革的意见(全文), Supreme People’s Court Five-
Year Reform Plan (2014-2018), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-02/26/c127520462 
.htm.  Susan Finder, a Hong Kong-based legal scholar, speculated, however, that such 
statements were made to give political cover to more substantial changes.  Don’t Call it 
Western: China’s Top Court Unveils Vision for Reform, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 26, 2015). 
 54. Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Judge Rejects Judicial Independence and Legal 
Reformers Wince, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/ 
asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou-qiang.html; China News Service, 最高法：划清与西 
方“司法独立”“三权鼎立”界限, http://news.china.com.cn/2015-02/26/content_34888966 
.htm), 
 55. Chris Buckley, China Warns Against Western Values in Imported Textbooks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2015), https://sinosphere.blogs.nyti0mes.com/2015/01/30/china-warns-
against-western-values-in-imported-textbooks/?_r=0. 
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the universal/western legal values that China accepted – at least in 
principle – under communist rule in some earlier eras.  Today, for 
example, to talk freely about constitutional reform, even within the 
sheltered confines of universities and academic journals, is not a safe 
enterprise.  And discussion of judicial independence from the 
Communist Party at the central level is a forbidden subject.56 
 
Comparative Law in a Time of Nativism 
 
Even in the best of times, comparative law is not without its 
critiques.  Several critiques historically plague the field with most in 
the category of methodological challenges. These methodological 
critiques contrast, however, with today’s objections that seem to be 
more emotionally based and normative in their opposition.   
Historically, comparative law is challenged as a discipline.  
Critics point to the body of existing scholarship that is mostly 
descriptive of foreign law, with or without explicit comparison, and 
that this body remains “random, unconnected, and thus 
inconsequential.”57  At its strongest, it is argued, this body of 
scholarship contributes to the categorization and world mapping of 
legal families, traditions, or cultures but has yet to develop any 
overarching theoretical basis or framework towards a better 
understanding of legal systems.  Situating more along the 
similarities end of the similarities/difference approach, this critique 
would like to see the development of broader theories to explain 
certain functional legal phenomena underlying different legal 
systems.   
On the other extreme, there are those comparativists who 
caution against the pronouncement of such “grand theories.”  
Particularly those who study non-western legal systems point to the 
danger of speculating broadly across cultures and across times, and 
 
 56. Jerome A. Cohen, A Looming Crisis for China’s Legal System, FOREIGN POLICY 
(Feb. 22, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/22/a-looming-crisis-for-chinas-legal-system. 
 57. Mathias Reiman, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half 
of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 699 (2002). 
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the danger that “efforts at engaging in broad theoretical work may 
unwittingly lead us to believe that we are considering foreign legal 
cultures in universal or value-free terms when, in fact, we are 
examining them through conceptual frameworks that are products 
of our own values and traditions, and that are often applied merely 
to see what foreign societies have to tell us about ourselves.”58   
These comparativists emphasize our responsibilities to 
appreciate more fully the importance of “descriptions” and, 
particularly, the type of textured, reflective examination that 
Clifford Geertz terms “thick description.” Not wishing to run the 
risk of cultural relativism, these critics recognize that the effort to 
understand a different legal system necessarily entail the formation 
of judgments.  But these critics argue for more thoughtful and 
careful comparisons and particular and modest, rather than grand, 
guidelines for our endeavor and conclusions. 
By contrast, there are those who voice concerns as to whether 
comparative law is even possible since law is so rooted in national 
traditions.59  These theorists, such as those in the “legal origins” 
school, would point to the different legal traditions as the root of 
national economic development and of indelible distinctions.  They 
reject projects of unification because “minds of continental and 
common lawyers follow incommensurable patterns of thought.”   
But notably, more recent critics have taken the critique beyond a 
methodological objection to voice an objection based more on fear 
that unification would erase traditions and national legal cultures.  
On a more philosophical level, recent critics focus their arguments 
not that it is impossible to do comparative methodology but rather 
that it is not normatively desirable. 
Thus, while U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts voiced a 
methodological objection to reference to international law by U.S. 
courts because consulting how other countries treat particular legal 
questions pending in the United States is like “looking out over a 
 
 58. William Alford, On The Limits of ‘Grand Theory’ in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. 
L. REV. 945 (1986). 
 59. See Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. 
REV. 1, 29 (1974). 
1. Margaret Woo-Comparative Law in a Time of Nativism ready for production.docx 11/21/2017  3:36 PM 
22 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:1 
crowd and picking out your friends,” Justice Samuel Alito, during his 
confirmation hearing, emphasized a more philosophical objection 
that, 
 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not want Americans 
to have the rights of people in France or the rights of people 
in Russia, or any of the other countries on the continent of 
Europe at the time.  They wanted them to have the rights of 
Americans, and . . . I don’t think it’s appropriate to look at 
foreign law. 
 
These recent changes present challenges to comparativists.  But 
comparative law and reference to foreign legal materials are more 
important than ever.  There is certainly no single answer, but rather, 
there are a number of cautionary guidelines to keep in mind in our 
comparative work.  This might mean adjusting our perspective, 
methodology and goals. 
 
        A. Law is National Identity 
 
Whether or not we like it, we must keep in mind and 
acknowledge that law is sovereign identity.  While in the past, we 
have recognized that law may be rooted in tradition, history and 
culture, we have not have fully appreciated the constitutive aspect of 
law in creating national identity.  Where previous institutions of 
religion and tribes defined a particular state, today, it is the 
institution of law and, “Directing judges to use certain legal sources 
is a means of locating sovereign identity in law.”60   
But unlike history or tradition or cultural identity in which one is 
born into, national identity is one that can be adopted, created and 
shed. And law, as both reflective and constitutive of this national 
identity, draws physical and as well as political boundaries.  Thus, 
for example, civil procedure laws define the overall parameters of a 
 
 60. JUDITH RESNIK, COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW 439 (Mads Andenas et al. eds., 
2015). 
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court’s authority, and jurisdiction rules delineate the political power 
of any given state.  Jurisdiction rules defines where a court sits in the 
political division of governance and draws a metaphysical border in 
authorizing a state’s right to exercise coercive power over an 
individual or dispute within and without its physical border.  Thus, 
the growth of a court’s jurisdiction often coincides with state 
expansion. As enactments of the state, procedural requirements are 
symbolic and physical messages as to the power of the state.  
Tensions between states often morph into more technical disputes 
over jurisdiction of the courts.  
Prominent political geographer, Richard Hartshorne, argued that 
the integration of a state’s territory involves two competing types of 
forces: centrifugal forces that pull populations apart (away from the 
center), and centripetal forces that pull populations together.61 
Centrifugal forces can include geographic divisions such as water 
bodies, mountain ranges or sheer areal size and distances that limit 
interaction by the state’s population. Human dimensions such as 
differences in religious belief, culture, and economic activity can 
also act as centrifugal forces. These forces can limit interaction, 
producing regionalism and creating dissimilarity among groups of 
citizens within a state. Under such circumstances, what stops a state 
from falling apart? If a state is to exist in a stable form, there must be 
centripetal forces of greater magnitude than the existing centrifugal 
forces.  Law can act both as a centrifugal or centripetal force.   
If recent events demonstrate the persistence of nation states and 
borders, then, we must find ways to delineate national identity 
through law without insisting on the exclusivity of a national legal 
regime.  Or in other words, how can we use law as a centripetal force 
(pulling populations together) and use comparative law without 
turning the exercise into one that is centrifugal force (pulling 
populations apart).  Comparative studies have the potential to 
promote law as a centripetal force.  Law is adaptive and the very act 
of comparative studies in recognizing differences and yet drawing 
out commonalities allows law to be adaptive in selective ways. Yet, 
 
 61. Richard Hartshorne, The Functional Approach to Political Geography, 40 ANNALS 
OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS, 95, 95–130 (June 1950).  
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fundamental to comparative law’s success must be an assurance that 
law is part and parcel of national identity and that the comparative 
gaze is not an erasure of national identity.  By recognizing that law is 
part and parcel of national identity, comparative law can reassure 
populations and combat their fears of change and the rise of 
nationalism as an exclusionary banner.   
 
       B.  Law is not “Neutral” 
 
One type of centrifugal force is inequality and so, one of our tasks 
must be to recognize the inherent power disparity in any legal reforms 
efforts and that the failure to recognize power imbalances can lead to 
hegemonic imposition of supposedly objective values by more 
economically developed countries onto less developed countries.  This 
is often the case with the at times messianic route of the U.S. with its 
many “rule of law” projects.  Such comparative law projects without 
recognizing inequality effects could act as a centrifugal force. 
Centrifugal force may also be part of a greater problem of 
comparative law taking on an evolutionary trajectory of legal 
reforms – often with modern civilization associated with adaptation 
of western legal norms.  And so, one task of comparativists is to 
recognize inequality and distributional ramifications and avoid 
evolutionary trajectory of any legal problem or solution we seek.  
Rather than taking on the “neutrality” of postwar comparativists, it is 
important not to be disengaged from ideological debates and 
participate less readily in public life or government work.62   
Critics, such as David Kennedy, have accused comparativists of 
“talking about distributional effects like accidental tourists.”63  The 
criticism is that comparativists downplay distributional consequences 
in assessing similarities and differences among legal regimes, and 
 
 62. This distance from practical engagement with government is explicitly promoted by 
Rodolfo Sacco, the Italian comparativist who provides the link between Schlesinger’s 
Cornell project and the current effort led by Sacco’s students to mobilize researchers for a 
description of the common core of European private law. 
 63. DAVID KENNEDY, THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 191 (Mauro 
Bassani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2003). 
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instead investigate and highlight technical similarities or cultural 
differences.  Yet, not only is this “objectivity” intellectually 
impossible, this “objective” perspective also limits the impact and 
contributions that comparative law can make.  The “objectively” 
neutral position would limit comparative law to societies that are 
comparatively similar, and to areas of law that are decidedly 
“apolitical” such as private and commercial law.  An emphasis only 
on private law would be in contradiction to the changed 
understanding of private law in the 20th century which reorients 
private law as a political tool of regulation, and which views 
constitutional and administrative law as the dominant areas of a 
country’s legal system superseding private law. 
In fact, comparative law can easily succumbed to inequality in 
the guise of neutrality and legal transplantation misused as a tool of 
colonization.64  Historically, comparisons between Chinese legal 
traditions and European ones are especially popular and indeed, lie at 
the heart of Max Weber’s seminal studies on economy and society.65  
But as pointed out by recent scholars such as Taisu Zhang,66 such 
comparative studies are often one sided with the comparisons done 
by those from more developed countries of legal systems in “less 
developed countries.”  Rarely are these works focused on better 
understanding European institutions.  Using European institutions as 
the benchmark risks “Eurocentricism” in which that “other parts of 
the world must become like Europe to “develop” or “modernize.”  
More problematically, “There is always the danger that something is 
‘lost in translation’” – some subtle but perhaps significant aspect of 
Chinese law actually becomes harder to understand once we explain 
them via comparison to European ones.  As such, comparative 
methods encourage us to overemphasize the differences, or overlook 
deeper distinctions that course beneath facial similarities. 
 
 64.  See, e.g., TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
MODERN LAW (2013). 
 65. MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Rheinstein ed. & 
trans., 1954). 
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We cannot ignore the reality of power disparities among the 
legal systems we study and the distributional effects of whatever 
solution we suggest.  Indeed, perhaps the most important factor in 
the transplantability of foreign models is the congruence between the 
comparative power structure of the receiver and sending country.  In 
other words, whenever we propose that the model from one country 
be applied in another country, we must always consider the 
comparative power structures of the two countries.  But if legal 
reform is to be achieved, the political context, the power 
differential between systems, and the recognition of distributional 
effects cannot be ignored.   
 
        C. Localization/Synchronization 
 
These ideas are also in line with present comparative law 
debates in China on the nature and aim of legal transplantation.  
Today, Chinese comparativists are concerned about the 
interrelationship between legal localization and legal 
transplantation; namely, the aim of legal transplantation being 
achieving localization.  Thus, Lijun Wang observes that recent 
trend of globalization has reflected a quality of localization and has 
affected the legal practice of sovereignty in various aspects.  While 
acknowledging that domestic laws and foreign legal experience can 
provide valuable information, Wang reminds us that the 
development of law is driven by social realities that have their own 
character of autonomy.  It is distinct from the “legal origins” school 
that posits the origins of a country’s legal system in one or the other 
legal family determines its economic success and ability to change.  
Rather, Wang’s position urges recognition of the determinants 
presented by social realities, and a study of the interconnectedness 
among these determinants.67  
In the area of civil procedure, for example, while class actions 
can be used to funnel social discontent into courts as in the U.S., in 
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countries such as China which values harmony above rights, class 
actions are seen as instigators in times of social instability.  Or, for 
example, it is difficult to apply the concept of burden of proof in a 
society with limited lawyers, particularly where substantive law has 
not adapted accordingly.  Similarly, a local preference for 
substantive justice may mean resistance to the concept of res 
judicata.  There must therefore be synchronization based on local 
conditions. 
Localization of foreign laws would contribute to the 
achievement of autonomy in the legal development of the state, and 
avoid imposition of formal changes without adjusting for bottom up 
resistance.  Globalization does not mean “de-nationalization.”  In the 
diverse legal order that can result from globalization, the sovereign 
state can maintain the independence and autonomy of its domestic 
laws even as it participates in comparative studies and understanding.  
As comparativists, we understand law, not only as the rules and how 
they operate in practice, but also from where these rules derive, the 
choices they represent, and the principles they encompass; that is, 
information and values that come from local syncronization.   
 
        D. Overlapping Rather than Convergence  
 
Finally, we may want to recognize the limitations of 
harmonization and convergence as the sole goals of comparative law.  
The goal of harmonization has driven mainstream comparative legal 
studies in Europe since the Paris Congress of 1900.  As Rodolfo 
Sacco concluded at the centennial celebration of the First Congress 
of Comparative Law, “comparative legal science triumphs because 
we are indebted (that is to say, mankind is indebted) to its 
masterpieces: harmonization, uniformity, and unification of the 
law.”68   
Unquestionably, harmonization has played an important role in 
the various comparative law projects of the European Union, 
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including that of the Common Core Project.  This project involves 
compiling the similarities and differences between European legal 
systems using detailed comparative law case studies.  Other groups 
connect comparative law surveys with normative searches for the 
best solution (Restatements).  This is the case for the Lando 
Commission on European Contract Law (Principles of European 
Contract Law) and the Study Group on a European Civil Code, 
which emerged from it, as well as the European Group on Tort Law 
(Principles of European Tort Law). 
As I mentioned earlier, the pressure for harmonization of 
domestic civil procedural rules is particularly strong today to prevent 
parties from forum shopping in transnational disputes.  As 
international economic transactions aided by technology increasingly 
lead to complex legal problems without borders, efforts were made 
to draft transnational rules such as the completion by the American 
Law Institute and UNIDROIT of the proposed “Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure.  While this work has substantial 
descriptive value as a source of comparative analysis of civil 
procedure, it also has a normative objective, which is to promote the 
international “harmonization” – in this context, apparently meaning 
uniformity or near-uniformity of procedural law.   
But an undue focus on harmonization or convergence can limit 
one to an undue focus on looking for single answers, which is 
problematic in a number of ways.  On the one hand, 
harmonization/convergence can funnel one into a view that only the 
state can make law, and neglect other sources of legal norms.  
Theorists, such as those within the legal pluralism school, have 
pointed out that legal orders may be rooted in different sources of 
legitimacy, such as tradition, religion, or the will of the people, and 
that such legal norms often coexist in the same field as state 
promulgated norms.69  Also, the reality of pluralism between state and 
nonstate legal orders inevitably takes the comparative focus away 
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from western legal systems and towards the customary law of 
developing countries, and the laws of groups and communities such as 
the Quakers, Romani, Native Americans, and religious organizations. 
Furthermore, harmonization as a sole goal also understates the 
undeniable task of law as a source of sovereign identity.  Brexit may 
be the strongest recent rejection of harmonization.  A single-minded 
push to harmonization may neglect to recognize the continued pull of 
distinct but equal spheres legal spheres defined by national borders.  
Harmonization and convergence, if at all, can only occur in the 
context of the overlapping normative orders of national legal 
systems, whether in Europe or elsewhere.  This preserves national 
identity, lessens resistance, even as it allows for each nation state’s 




In sum, comparative law needs to revisit its mission in the latest 
turn of global events.  Undeniably, the historical tensions of 
comparative law methodology – similarities and differences, 
functionalism and cultural studies – remain all too clearly reflected 
in the present day of comparative law.  But in the light of rising 
nationalism/nativism worldwide, we may be better served if we were 
to focus on the interaction of the two trends – that is, global legal 
exchanges (not convergence) and assertion of local practices.  
The suggestion is not to abandon the task of globalization.  In 
this world of transnational economy, globalization is inevitable.  
But rather than rushing headlong to harmonization or 
convergence, the recent resurgence of national interest may be a 
reminder that we as comparativists have a task of serving as 
mediators.  It is the process of adaptation that warrants inquiry 
rather than simply the relentless pursuit of harmonization or any 
“grand” theory.”  An undue focus on harmonization or 
convergence can limit one to looking for single answers and to the 
perennial common law/civil law divide.70  And the development of 
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grand theories of law, or the ambitious multicountry rankings 
downplays the function of comparative law as the discipline that 
attempts to understand the various legal systems in their totality 
(similarities and differences) and in their relationship to each other.  
Without the ambition of promoting a generalized theory of the law, 
one can examine one aspect of a legal norm in the context of “thick 
descriptions,” and develop an understanding of how each is related to 
each other.  This is not an apology for totalitarian departures nor am I 
downplaying the positive force of universality and rights.  Rather, I am 
simply proposing a comparative law methodology that is more attuned 
to history, culture, context, and difference. 
Indeed, such a comparative method can provide a check on the 
claim of jurists within a legal system who argue that their method 
rests purely on logic and deduction.  Proponents of looking at “legal 
formants” make it possible to keep the ambivalence and multiplicity 
of legal rules in each system at play in the comparison.  Living law 
contains any different elements such as statutory rules, formulation 
of scholars, decision of judges, and the multiplicity can give rise to 
several interpretations with no single one being correct and the other 
one false.  “Within a given legal system with multiple ‘legal 
formants’ there is no guarantee that they will be in harmony rather 
than in conflict.”71 
As Oscar Chase so succinctly wrote, we as students of 
comparative procedure must marvel “at the persistence of local 
forms to which even we worldly scholars feel no small attachment.  
We should understand our work as mediating between the global and 
local.”  Both local culture and universal rule of law are features in 
contemporary social development and it is their interplay that 
provides the critical foundation for new and more adaptive values 
and institutions to emerge. 
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